Abstract. In this paper, we propose some extensions of epistemic logic for reasoning about information fusion. The fusion operators considered in this paper include majority merging, arbitration, and general merging. Some modalities corresponding to these fusion operators are added to epistemic logics and the Kripke semantics of these extended logics are presented. While most existing approaches treat information fusion operators as meta-level constructs, these operators are directly incorporated into our object logic language. Thus it is possible to reason about not only the merged results but also the fusion process in our logics.
Introduction
The philosophical analysis of knowledge and belief has stimulated the development of the so-called epistemic logic [21] . This kind of logic has attracted the attention of researchers from diverse fields such as artificial intelligence(AI), economics, linguistics, and theoretical computer science. Among them, the AI researchers and computer scientists develop some technically sophisticated formalisms and apply them to the analysis of distributed and multi-agent systems [20, 36] .
The application of epistemic logic to AI and computer science puts its emphasis on the interaction of agents, so multi-agent epistemic logic is urgently needed. One representative example of such logic is proposed by Fagin et al. [20] . The term "knowledge" is used in a broad sense in [20] to cover cases of belief and information. 1 The most novel feature of their logic is the consideration of common knowledge and distributed knowledge among a group of agents. Distributed knowledge is that which can be deduced by pooling together everyone's knowledge. While it is required that proper knowledge must be true, the belief of an agent may be wrong. Therefore, in general, there will be conflict in the beliefs to be merged. In this case, everything can be deduced from the distributed beliefs due to the notorious omniscience property of epistemic logic, so the merged result will be useless for further reasoning.
Instead of directly putting all beliefs of the agents together, there are other sophisticated techniques for knowledge base merging [12, 15, [25] [26] [27] [33] [34] [35] . Most of the approaches treat belief fusion operators as meta-level constructs, so given a set of knowledge bases, these fusion operators will return the merged results. More precisely, a fusion operator is used to combine a set of knowledge bases T 1 , T 2 , · · · , T k , where each knowledge base is a theory in some logical langauge.
Some of the above-mentioned works present concrete operators that can be used directly in the fusion process, while others stipulate the desirable properties of reasonable belief fusion operators by postulates. However, few of the approaches provide the capability of reasoning about the fusion process. In this paper, we propose that belief fusion operators can be incorporated into the object language of the multi-agent epistemic logic, so we can reason not only with the merged results but also about the fusion process.
Preliminary
Let L denote the language of epistemic logic. The alphabet of L contains the following symbols: a countable set Φ 0 = {p, q, r, . . .} of atomic propositions; the propositional constants ⊥ (falsum or falsity constant) and (verum or truth constant); the binary Boolean operator ∨ (or), and unary Boolean operator ¬ (not); a set Ag = {1, 2, . . . , n} of agents; the modal operator-forming symbols "[" and "]"; and the left and right parentheses "(" and ")".
The set of well-formed formulas(wffs)is defined as the smallest set containing Φ 0 ∪ {⊥, } and closed under Boolean operators and the following rule: if ϕ is a wff, then [G]ϕ is a wff for any nonempty G ⊆ Ag.
The intuitive meaning of [G] ϕ is "The group of agents G has distributed belief ϕ"
As usual, other classical Boolean connectives ∧ (and), ⊃ (implication), and ≡ (equivalence) can be defined as abbreviations. Also, we will write G ϕ as an abbreviation of ¬[G]¬ϕ. When G is a singleton {i}, we will write [i]ϕ instead of [{i}]ϕ, so [i]ϕ means that agent i knows ϕ.
For the semantics, a possible world model for L is a structure
where -W is a set of possible worlds,
W is a truth assignment mapping each atomic proposition to the set of worlds in which it is true. From the binary relations R i 's, we can define a derived relation R G for each nonempty G ⊆ Ag:
Informally, R i (w) is the set of worlds that agent i considers possible under w according to his belief, so R G (w) is the set of worlds that are considered possible under w according to the direct fusion of agents' beliefs. The informal intuition is reflected in the definition of the satisfaction relation. Let M = (W, (R i ) 1≤i≤n , V ) be a model and Φ be the set of wffs for L, then the satisfaction relation |= M ⊆ W × Φ is defined by the following inductive rules(we will use the infix notation for the relation and omit the subscript M for convenience):
In the presentation below, we will extensively use the notions of pre-order. Let S be a set, then a pre-order over S is a reflexive and transitive binary relation ≤ on S. A pre-order over S is called total (or connected) if for all x, y ∈ S, either x ≤ y or y ≤ x holds. We will write x < y as the abbreviation of x ≤ y and y ≤ x. For a subset S of S, min(S , ≤) is defined as the set {x ∈ S | ∀y ∈ S , y < x}.
Merging by Majority
Majority voting is a method to resolve conflict between agents. For example, if three knowledge bases T 1 = {ϕ}, T 2 = {ϕ}, and T 3 = {¬ϕ} are combined, then the result would be {ϕ}, since two vote for ϕ, whereas only one votes against it.
One of the most general merging functions based on majority is defined in [34] . A function M erge is applied to weighted knowledge bases. Let wt :
+ be a weight function which assigns a positive real number to each component knowledge base, then a total pre-order over the set of propositional interpretations is defined as:
where dist is a function denoting the distance between a propositional interpretation and a knowledge base. When the propositional language is finite, the so-called Dalal distance (or Hamming distance) between two interpretations of the language is used [16] . It is defined as the number of atoms whose valuations differs in the two interpretations. Let dist(w, w ) denote the Dalal distance between two interpretations w and w , then the distance from w to a theory T , denoted by dist(w, T ), is defined as:
where Ω is the set of all propositional interpretations and is ({T1,T2,···,T k },wt) .
This kind of weighted merging operator can be incorporated into epistemic logic in the following way. Syntactically, a new class of modal operators [M (G, wt)] for any nonempty G ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , n} and weight function wt : Ag → R + is added to our logic language. Then the semantics for the new modal operators is defined by extending a possible world model to (W, (
is a distance metric function between possible worlds satisfying µ(w, w) = 0 and µ(w, w ) = µ(w , w).
The distance metric between possible worlds is defined as in the semantics of conditional logic [37, 40] . The distance from a possible world w to the belief state of an agent i in the possible world u is defined by:
Then a total pre-order u (G,wt) over the possible worlds is defined for each possible world u and modal operator [M (G, wt)]:
The most straightforward definition for the satisfaction of the wff [M (G, wt)]ϕ is:
However, since for infinite W , the set min(W, u (G,wt) ) may be empty, the definition may result in u |= [M (G, wt)]⊥ in some cases. Alternatively, since u (G,wt) is a total pre-order, it is simply a system-of-spheres in the semantics of conditional logic [37] , so we can define the satisfaction of the wff [M (G, wt)]ϕ by u |= [M (G, wt)]ϕ iff there exists w 0 such that for all w u (G,wt) w 0 , w |= ϕ. Note that the function wt is used only for encoding the reliability of agents. It is tempting to propagate the weights into a group of agents so that we have a weight wt(G) for each group G. This weight may be useful in the belief fusion of two groups of agents. However, we do not really need this because if we want to merge the beliefs of two groups G 1 and G 2 , we can simply merge the beliefs of agents in G 1 ∪ G 2 .
Arbitration
The notion of distance measure between possible worlds is also used in arbitration, another type of merging operator [32, 38, 39] .
A semantic characterization for arbitration is given in [32] . A knowledge base in [32] is identified with a set of propositional models, thus the semantic characterization for this kind of arbitration is given by assigning to each subset of models A a binary relation ≤ A over the set of model sets satisfying the following conditions (the subscript is omitted when it means all binary relations of the form ≤ A ):
By slightly abusing the notation, ≤ A may also denote binary relations between models in the sense that w ≤ A w iff {w} ≤ A {w }. The arbitration between two sets of models A and B is then defined as:
To incorporate the arbitration operator of [32] into epistemic logic, we first note that according to (1) , the arbitration is commutative but not necessarily associative. Thus, the arbitration operator should be a binary operator between two agents. We can add a class of modal operators for arbitration into our logic just as in the case of majority merging. However, to be more expressive, we will also consider the interaction between arbitration and other epistemic operators, so we define the set of arbitration expressions over Ag recursively as the smallest set containing Ag and closed under the binary operators +, ·, and . Here + and · correspond respectively to the distributed belief and the so-called "everybody knows" operators in multi-agent epistemic logic [20] . Then the operator [G] in epistemic logic can be replaced with a new class of modal operators [a] where a is an arbitration expression.
For the semantics, a model is extended to (W, (R i ) 1≤i≤n , V, ≤), where ≤ is a function assigning to each subset of possible worlds A a binary relation ≤ A ⊆ 2 W ×2 W satisfying the above-mentioned five conditions. Note that the first two conditions imply that ≤ A is a pre-order over 2 W . Then for each arbitration expression, we can define the binary relations R a b , R a·b and R a+b over W recursively by:
Thus the satisfaction for the wff [a]ϕ is defined as: By this kind of modal operators, the postulates 2-8 of [32] can be translated into the following axioms:
Note that the original distributed belief operator [G] is equivalent to
However, since the set of possible worlds W may be infinite in our logic, the minimal models in (3) may not exist, so the axioms 4 and 7 are not sound with respect to the semantics. To make them sound, we must add the following limit assumption [2] to the binary relations ≤ A for any A ⊆ W : for any nonempty U ⊆ W , min(U, ≤ A ) is nonempty.
General Merging
In [26] , an axiomatic framework unifying the majority merging and arbitration operators is presented. A set of postulates common to majority and arbitration operators is first proposed to characterize the general merging operators and then additional postulates for differentiating them are considered respectively. In that framework, a knowledge base is also a finite set of propositional sentences. The general merging operator is defined as a mapping from a multi-set 3 of knowledge base, called a knowledge set, to a knowledge base. Therefore, the arbitration operator defined via this approach can merge more than two knowledge bases, whereas the definition of arbitration operator in [32] is limited to two knowledge bases. The merging operator is denoted by , so for each knowledge set E, (E) is a knowledge base. Two equivalent semantic characterizations are also given for the merging operators. One is based on the so-called syncretic assignment. A syncretic assignment maps each knowledge set E to a pre-order ≤ E over interpretations such that some conditions reflecting the postulated properties of the merging operators must be satisfied. Then (E) is the knowledge base whose models are the minimal interpretations according to ≤ E . This logical framework is further extended to dealing with integrity constraints in [27] . Let E be a knowledge set and ϕ be a propositional sentence denoting the integrity constraints, then the merging of knowledge bases in E with integrity constraint ϕ, ϕ (E), is a knowledge base which implies ϕ. The models of ϕ (E) are characterized by min(M od(ϕ), ≤ E ), i.e., the minimal models of ϕ with respect to the ordering ≤ E . ϕ (E) is called an IC merging operator. According to the semantics, it is obvious that (E) is a special case of IC merging operator (E). It is also shown that when E contains exactly one knowledge base, the operator is reduced to the AGM revision operator proposed in [1] .
Therefore, IC merging is general enough to cover majority merging, arbitration, and AGM revision operator.
To incorporate IC merging operators into epistemic logic, we will extend its syntax with the following formation rule:
-if ϕ and ψ are wffs, then for any nonempty G ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}, [ ϕ (G)]ψ is also a wff.
For the convenience of naming, we will call a subset of possible worlds a belief state. Let U = {U 1 , U 2 , . . . , U k } denote a multi-set of belief states, then U = U 1 ∩ · · · U k . For the semantics, a possible world model is extended to (W, (R i ) 1≤i≤n , V, ≤), where ≤ is an assignment mapping each multi-set of belief states U to a total pre-order ≤ U over W satisfying the following conditions:
1. If w, w ∈ U, then w ≤ U w , 2. If w ∈ U and w ∈ U then w < U w , 3. For any w ∈ U 1 , there exists w ∈ U 2 , such that w ≤ {U1,U2} w, where U 1 and U 2 are two belief states, 4. If w ≤ U1 w and w ≤ U2 w , then w ≤ U1 U2 w , where denotes the union of two multi-sets, 5. If w < U1 w and w ≤ U2 w , then w < U1 U2 w . These conditions are model-theoretic correspondences of those for syncretic assignments in [26, 27] . Condition 1 says that possible worlds appearing in the belief states of all agents are equally plausible. Condition 2 asserts that a possible worlds appearing in the belief states of all agents is more plausible than those not. Condition 3 requires that all agents are treated fairly. Therefore, if agent 1 considers w possible, then w is not more plausible than all worlds in the belief state of agent 2. Conditions 4 and 5 essentially require that if two groups of agents agree on the ordering between w and w , then the united group of these two groups does not reverse the ordering.
For a group of agents G and a possible world u, let us define a total pre-order ≤ u G over W as follows:
w ≤ u G w iff w ≤ {Ri(u)|i∈G} w . The truth condition of [ ϕ (G)]ψ is defined as that for conditional logic [10, 9] . Formally, u |= [ ϕ (G)]ψ iff (i) there are no possible worlds in W satisfying ϕ, or (ii) there exists w 0 ∈ W such that w 0 |= ϕ and for any w ≤ u G w 0 , w |= ϕ ⊃ ψ. Note that in IC merging, a knowledge set consists of a multi-set of objective sentences, whereas for the modal operator [ ϕ (G)], G is a set of agents whose beliefs may contain subjective sentences or beliefs of other agents. Also, an integrity constraint in [27] must be an objective sentence, whereas ϕ may be arbitrary complex wffs of our extended language. Furthermore, instead of selecting minimal models of ϕ, since the set of possible worlds may be infinite in our case, we adopt the system-of-spheres semantics as in section 2 for the epistemic operator [ ϕ (G)].
Unlike knowledge merging, where the component knowledge bases are equally important, belief change is a kind of asymmetry operator, where new information always outweighs the old. The main belief change operators are belief revision and update. They are characterized by different postulates [1, 23, 24] . In [23] , a uniform model-theoretic framework is provided for the semantic characterization of the revision and update operators. In that context, a knowledge base is a finite set of propositional sentences, so it can also be represented by a single sentence(i.e., the conjunction of all sentences in the knowledge base).
For the revision operator, it is assumed that there is a total pre-order ≤ ψ over the propositional interpretations for each knowledge base ψ. The revision operators satisfying the AGM postulates in [1] are exactly those that select from the models of the new information ϕ the minimal ones with respect to the ordering ≤ ψ . More precisely, let ψ be a knowledge base and ϕ denote the new information, then the result of revising ψ by ϕ, denoted by ψ • ϕ, will have the set of models
As for the update operator, assume for each propositional interpretation w, there exists some partial pre-order ≤ w over the interpretations for closeness to w, then update operators select for each model w in M od(ψ) the set of models from M od(ϕ) that are closest to w. The updated theory is characterized by the union of all such models. That is,
where ψ ϕ is the result of updating the knowledge base ψ by ϕ.
Both belief revision and update may occur in the observation of new information ϕ. For belief revision, it is assumed that the world is static, so if the new information is incompatible with the agent's original beliefs, then the agent may have an incorrect belief about the world. Thus he will try to accommodate the new information by minimally changing his original beliefs. However, for the belief update, it is assumed that the observation may be due to dynamic changes of the outside world, so the agent's belief may be out-of-date, though it may be totally correct for the original world. Thus the agent will assume the possible worlds are those resulting from the minimal change of the original world. In [11] , a generalized update model is proposed which combines aspects of both revision and update. It is shown that a belief update model will be inadequate without modelling the dynamic aspect (i.e. the events causing the update) in the same time. Since the dynamic change of the external worlds does not play a role in the belief fusion process, we will not model belief update in our logic. Therefore, in what follows, we will concentrate on the belief revision operator.
Let us now consider the possibility of incorporating the belief revision operator into epistemic logic. In addition to the original meaning of revising a knowledge base ψ by new information ϕ, there is an alternative reading for the revision operator. That is, we can consider • as a prioritized belief fusion operator that gives priority to its second argument [22] . In the context of knowledge base revision, these two interpretations are essentially equivalent. However, from the perspective of our logic in multi-agents systems, they may be quite different. Roughly speaking, i • ϕ will denote the result of revising the beliefs of agent i by new information ϕ, whereas i • j is the result of merging the beliefs of agents i and j by giving priority to j. More formally, a revision expression will be defined inductively as follows:
-If 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n and ϕ is a wff, then i • j and i • ϕ are revision expressions.
-If r is a revision expression, 1 ≤ i ≤ n and ϕ is a wff, then r • i and r • ϕ are revision expressions.
The syntactic rule is extended to include the modal operators [r] for any revision expression r, so [r]ϕ would be a wff if ϕ is. Note that a revision expression allows us to represent a revision sequence, which is directly related to iterated revision in [8, 17] .
To interpret the modal operator in our semantic framework, a possible world model is extended to (W, (R i ) 1≤i≤n , V, ≤), where ≤ is an assignment mapping each belief state (i.e. subset of possible worlds) U to a total pre-order ≤ U over W such that (i) if w, w ∈ U , then w ≤ U w and (ii) if w ∈ U and w ∈ U , then w < U w . Let S·U denote the sequence (U 1 , U 2 , · · · , U k , U ) if S = (U 1 , U 2 , · · · , U k ) is a sequence of belief state, then the assignment ≤ is extended to sequences of belief states in the following way (we assume ≤ (U ) =≤ U ):
Concluding Remarks
In preceding sections, we assume an agent's belief states are represented as a subset of possible worlds, i.e. R i (w) is the belief state of agent i in world w. However, some more fine-grained representations have been also proposed, such as total pre-orders over the set of possible worlds [8, 17, 28, 41] , ordinal conditional functions [11, 43, 44] , possibility distributions [3, 18, 19] , belief functions [42] and pedigreed belief states [22] . Further development of logical systems that incorporate fusion operators based on more fine-grained representations of belief states should be a very interesting research direction.
We mainly present the semantics of epistemic logics for information fusion in this paper. However, to do practical reasoning, we must develop proof methods for these logics. There have been some previous works on the development of axiomatic or Gentzen-style calculi for information fusion. For example, in [4] [5] [6] [7] , logics for information fusion based on possibility theory are proposed. The Hilbert-style or Gentzen-style proof systems of those logics are also presented. In particular, the logic PL ⊗ n in [4] is an extension of QML in [29] [30] [31] with distributed belief operator, so the fusion operator in PL ⊗ n is different than the merging operators used in this paper. The axiomatic system and theorem prover for a majority fusion logic M F have also been developed in [13, 14] . The belief bases in M F are sets of literals, so it does not allow nested modalities as in our logics. In spite of these differences, the further development of proof theory for logics proposed in this paper could take these previous works as good starting points.
